INTRODUCTION
As their dockets swell, federal judges' tolerance for attorney mis conduct wears thin.1 More than ever, judges are willing to impose sanctions for abuses of federal court processes, including frivolous ap peals.2 As one judge explained, " [w] ith courts struggling to remain 1. Hill v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1203 (7th Cir. 1987 ) (explaining that, "[a]s should be evident to any regular reader of federal court decisions, the frequency with which federal judges are imposing sanctions for abuse of federal court process has in creased markedly in recent years").
2. See, e.g., Eltech Sys. Corp. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 903 F.2d 805, 811-12 (Fed. Cir. 1990 ) (awarding attorney fees and double costs):
This is another in what appears to be a gradually increasing number of frivolous appeals to this court .... [Appellant] has based its appeal on baseless arguments and an attempt to re try its case, employing baseless arguments and misstatements of the record. That it found those practices necessary should have told it this appeal was frivolous.
afloat in a constantly rising sea of litigation, a frivolous appeal can it self be a form of obscenity."3
Aside from the need to reduce caseloads, other factors underlie the courts' willingness to impose sanctions for fr ivolous appeals. One concern is that the costs to responsible, ethical litigants increase sharply when the court system's resources are diverted to meritless claims.4 Another motivating factor is the simple desire to "insur[e] jus tice to the appellee."5 Also exacerbating courts' frustrations with frivolous appeals is their realization that, as the judiciary and bar have grown, attorneys' incentive to regulate themselves has weakened be cause it is now less likely that any attorney will have to appear regu larly before the same judge.6 Congress provided federal judges with an arsenal of statutes and rules they may use to impose sanctions and thereby defend themselves against abusive tactics.7 Chief among them, Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure states: "If a court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may ... award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee."8 Pursuant to Rule 38, federal appellate courts have found it appropriate to impose sanctions in a variety of cases, such as when the arguments presented in an appeal are "utterly baseless,"9 when the arguments presented are irrelevant or bizarre,10 7. For example, a fe deral court may impose a sanction in the amount of costs, expenses and attorney fees against an attorney who "multiplies the proceedings in any case unrea sonably and vexatiously." 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2001) . Courts also may use the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1912 to penalize frivolous appeals, since this provision provides that an appellate court can award single or double costs as damages for delay. 28 U.S.C § 1912 (2001) ("Where a judgment is affirmed by the Supreme Court or a court of appeals, the court in its discretion may adjudge to the prevailing party just damages for his delay, and single or dou ble costs."). Also, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court can sanction a party and/or the party's attorney for filing groundless pleadings, motions, or other papers. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 8. FED. R. APP. P. 38.
9. E.g., Doyle v. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n, 998 F.2d 1559, 1571 (10th Cir. 1993 ) (ordering plaintiff and counsel to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed where they "have appealed and persisted on appeal in arguments which are utterly baseless, and patently in-when "there [are] no reasonable, good-faith arguments advanced for the extension, modification, or reversal of precedent,"11 and when it is clear that an appellant filed an appeal simply to delay the inevitable.12 Furthermore, appellate courts have generally understood that it is within their authority to raise sua sp onte the issue of Rule 38 sanc tions. 13 Rule 38's language, however, gives little guidance as to when a court should award such sanctions. From the Rule's use of the word "may," it is clear that whether to impose sanctions under the Rule is discretionary.14 If it were mandatory, a word such as "must" or "shall" might have been used, as it is in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.15 Because Rule 38's language makes no mention of whom to sanction, it is also unclear whether the appellant, the appellant's at torney, or both should bear the burden of such sanctions. Further more, the Rule neither defines what are "j ust" damages nor indicates the circumstances appropriate for imposing single costs, as opposed to double costs. 16 The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 38 do not give consistent with a massive body of authority, as well as raising claims -all specious -not fairly raised in the complaint under review"). '· 10. E.g. , Cronin v. Town of Amesbury, 81 F.3d 257, 261 (1st Cir. 1996 ) (assessing double costs as "just damages" for the appeal where "a cursory reading of the relevant case law and treatises would have shown" that the appeal was frivolous, and where the appellant's attor ney presented bizarre and irrelevant arguments on appeal).
11. Coghlan v. Starkey, 852 F.2d 806, 808 (5th Cir. 1988 ).
12. E.g. , SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1098-99 (5th Cir. 1993 ) (imposing double costs un der Rule 38 because the appeal was "nothing more than a frivolous play for time, delaying the inevitable by wasting the resources of this court and the [appellee] SEC alike").
13. E.g. , Romala Corp. v. United States, 927 F.2d 1219, 1225 (1991); Coghlan, 852 F.2d at 809; Hill , 814 F.2d at 1203; Reis v. Morrison, 807 F.2d 112, 113 (7th Cir. 1986 ) (" [W] e have decided to use our authority under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to award attorney's fees on our own initiative .... ").
14. See FED. R. APP. P. 38.
15. See FED. R. C1v. P. ll(c) ("If ... the court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may ... impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation."); see also 16A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 3984.1, at 646 ("The 'j ust damages and single or double costs' mentioned in Rule 38 are awardable by the court as a matter of discretion."); cf Ross v. City of Waukegan, 5 F.3d 1084, 1089 n.6 (7th Cir. 1993) (explaining that "it is within the sound discretion of the district court whether to grant or to deny sanctions under § 1927" because, unlike the "shall" language in Rule 11, a court "may" award fees under section 1927). The Wright treatise explains:
In most cases, the appellee must file a motion to have the damages and costs awarded to it, although the court sometimes may perform the task for the appellee in its opinion affirming or dismissing the appeal. But the grant of such an award under Rule 38 remains within the discretion of the court of appeals, which can either assess the damages itself or remand the case to the district court to make that determination.
16A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 3984, at 643. [I]t is imperative that when courts impose sanctions for frivolous appeals, they do so in ac cord with a procedure that is consistent with due process requirements. It is also essential that courts develop a clearly articulated definition of frivolous appeals, indicating, in par ticular, whether an obj ective or subjective standard is used. Further, they must clearly distin guish between (1) a sanction imposed for taking a meritless appeal, and (2) a sanction im posed for abusive litigation tactics during the pendency of an appeal with merit.
Id. at 849. Martineau concludes by proposing a revision in the statutes and rules governing the assessment of sanctions by federal courts of appeals. Id set of courts reads a scienter24 requirement into Rule 38. Pursuant to this subjective approach, a court demands at least some evidence of bad faith before imposing Rule 38 sanctions.25 Conceding that the is sue of whether bad faith is an element of Rule 38 is still not "free of doubt," the Sixth Circuit sided with the set of courts that use an objec tive approach. 26 Both the subjective and the objective approaches to Rule 38 have some identifiable problems. A court that makes a subjective inquiry into bad faith· may be reading into the Rule a requirement that its drafters did not intend. On the other hand, courts that apply a purely objective test may threaten an attorney's ability to fulfill his ethical duty to represent with zeal the interests of his client27 -a conse quence that can also create a "chilling effect" on novel appeals.28 Also, a purely "objective" test may achieve inequitable results when either pro se appellants or attorneys who work for large institutional clients and exercise little control over the litigation are held to the same stan dard as those attorneys who are experts in their fields and those who do exercise control over the litigation.29
24. "Scienter" is defined as: "1. A degree of knowledge that makes a person legally re sponsible for the consequences of his or her act or omission; the fact of an act's having been done knowingly . The mere finding that a position advanced was frivolous must not be cause for discipline of the attorney because of the danger that such action might inhibit the bar from the most vig orous advocacy of the clients' positions and thus restrict meaningful access to the court. Fur thermore, an attorney would face an intolerable dilemma when the needs or instructions of his client would force him to argue a position which he personally may feel to lack merit, and which could lead to punitive action against him by the court. Cir. 1996) ). The Zahran court applied this two-part test to determine that Rule 38 sanc tions were appropriate not only because appellants omitted and failed to distinguish signifi cant cases in their opening brief, but also because the district court had told them that their claims were foreclosed. They nevertheless appealed without offering any argument to un dermine the district court's conclusion. See id.; see also Martineau, Frivolous Appeals, supra note 21, at 852-53 n.38-43, 48-50 (listing cases where courts have inferred bad faith from cer tain types of conduct, including refusing to participate in discovery or other court-ordered activities, making misstatements, key omissions, or other misrepresentations in the briefs, and filing an appeal despite the previous dismissals of similar lawsuits or similar meritless appeals).
34. E.g. , Gilles v. Burton Constr. Co., 736 F.2d 1142, 1146-47 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding that even though the appeal is "frivolous" within the terms of Rule 38, it was not "appropriate" to impose sanctions where appellants were not solely responsible for the confusing record and had nothing to gain by delay or the harassment of an appeal); McCandless v. Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co., 697 F.2d 198, 200-01 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that since "[t]he only litigants who are likely to be deterred [from bringing frivolous claims] are those who are aware that their claim is baseless but press on for some improper reason, such as harassment," it be comes necessary to evaluate subjective bad faith at the second part of a two-step analysis) (emphasis added); Martineau, Frivolous Appeals, supra note 21, at 870-71 (proposing that, while the objective merits of the appeal are all-important to the initial determination of friv olousness, the appellant's conduct (or that of his attorney) should only be significant to de termine the nature and extent of the sanction to be imposed: "The more flagrant the con duct, the clearer it is that the intent or motive of the person is culpable and the larger the sanction should be .... [T] he conduct or intent should be the measure of the sanction, not the measure of the merit of the appeal"). [Vol. 100:1156 This Note argues that Rule 38 requires federal appellate courts to apply a single-step, objective standard that does not take into account the subjective state of mind of the appellant or the appellant's attor ney. It also argues that it is appropriate for courts imposing Rule 38 sanctions to command the appellant's attorney, rather than the appel lant, to pay for the appellee's actual costs and attorney fees. Part I as serts that neither the plain language nor the legislative history of Rule 38 indicates that the Rule has a scienter requirement and proposes a single-step "reasonable attorney" test for defining frivolity under Rule 38. Part II argues that a court should ordinarily impose the full burden of Rule 38 sanctions upon the appellant's attorney, rather than the ap pellant. This approach is best because, if a reasonable attorney stan dard is appropriate for defining frivolity, it also makes sense to disci pline the attorney who acted unreasonably by making the frivolous arguments, rather than to discipline the client who was not responsible for the merits of those arguments. In cases where the attorney repre sents a sophisticated institutional client that does not rely completely on the advice of its attorney, however, a court should impose Rule 38 sanctions jointly on the attorney and the client to ensure that all of those responsible for the appeal's frivolity will bear the burden of such sanctions. Part III explains why a single-step reasonable attorney test best advances the policy goal of deterring frivolous appeals. This Part also argues, however, that cases involving pro se appellants warrant an exception to the reasonable attorney test. This Note concludes that, by using a single-step reasonable attorney test and by imposing the full burden of Rule 38 sanctions against the attorneys responsible for filing meritless appeals, federal appellate courts can deter frivolous appeals and, in so doing, keep themselves afloat in the rising sea of litigation.
I.
RULE 38 WARRANTS A SINGLE-STEP "REASONABLE
ATTORNEY" TEST
This Part argues that, in deciding whether to impose Rule 38 sanc tions, a court should apply an objective, single-step "reasonable attor ney" test. Section I.A asserts that Rule 38 is an objective rule focused on the merits of an appeal, rather than the bad faith of an appellant or an appellant's attorney. Section LB argues that courts should apply a reasonable attorney test to determine whether an appeal is frivolous for purposes of Rule 38. To avoid a chilling effect on novel appeals, however, a court should be careful to classify as frivolous only those appeals that have no colorable legal support. Section LC maintains that only one step of objective analysis is necessary. No subjective "second step" is necessary to determine when a sanction is necessary to assign blame or to calculate a just sanction.
A. Rule 38 Has No Scienter Requirement
A textual analysis of Rule 38's plain language demonstrates that the Rule has no scienter requirement, and therefore, does not require an inquiry into the bad faith of the appellant or the appellant's attor ney. To determine Rule 38's requirements, one should focus on the ordinary meaning of the Rule's language in its textual context, and then ask whether there is any clear indication that some permissible meaning other than the ordinary one applies.35 The plain language of Rule 38 makes no mention of a scienter requirement: "If a court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may, after a sepa rately filed motion or notice from the court and reasonable opportu nity to respond, award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee. "36 Unlike 28 U.S.C. § 1927, a rule allowing sanctions against an attorney who multiplies proceedings "vexatiously,"37 Rule 38 has no language corresponding to the term "vexatiously" that gives courts a text-based justification for reading a bad faith requirement into the Rule.38 Courts should not interpret the word "frivolous" to include bad faith intent. The ordinary meaning of the word "frivolous," when referring to an argument, is "trifling," "trivial," "of little value or importance," or It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the lan guage in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, and if the law is within the constitu tional authority of the law-making body which passed it, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms. 
Pursuant to section 1927:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexa tiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and at torneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct. "not worth notice" -bad faith is not a part of the definition.39 Like wise, in a leading law dictionary, the first definition of "frivolous" is purely objective: "lacking a legal basis or legal merit,"40 and a "frivo lous appeal" is obj ectively defined as "[a]n appeal having no legal ba sis."41 Furthermore, the legislative history of Rule 38 makes no defini tive statement about scienter.42 Thus, there is no clear indication that an appellant's bad faith -or that of his attorney -is relevant at any stage of the Rule 38 analysis.43 Although the Rule's silence concerning scienter may not be dispositive evidence of Congressional intent,44 there still is no clear indication that any permissible meaning other than the ordinary meaning of the Rule's language should apply. The Rule's objective language, therefore, lends support to courts that have argued that Rule 38 is concerned only with the obj ective merits of an 39. WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 735 (2d. ed. 1983).
40. BLACK'S LA w DICTIONARY 677 (7th ed. 1999). Black's dictionary lists "not serious" and "not reasonably purposeful" as second and third definitions, respectively. Id. While it may be possible that these second and third definitions could be interpreted as subjective, it would nonetheless be a stretch to interpret either to mean "bad faith." Furthermore, that they are listed as second and third definitions should indicate that they are not as common place as the first definition, which is purely objective.
41. Id. The definition of "frivolous appeal" also explains that such appeals are "usu( ally] filed for delay to induce a judgment creditor to settle or to avoid payment of a judgment." Id. 42. See FED. R. APP. P. 38 Advisory Comm. Notes (1967). The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 38 make clear that, under the Rule, a court of appeals need not require a showing that the appeal in question resulted in any kind of "delay." Id. 43. See Romala Corp. v. United States, 927 F.2d 1219, 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1991):
[T)he subjective intent of Romala and its attorneys in making irrelevant arguments and grossly inaccurate statements is immaterial ... The controlling consideration in the imposi tion of sanctions, then, is the consistently inaccurate and irrelevant character of Romala's as sertions of fact, which is clear on the face of the briefs and for which no exonerating explana tion is possible. Since our imposition of sanctions is thus based on a frivolity that is wholly contained within the written submissions, no separate briefing or argument on the issue would be useful. (citation omitted).
Id.; Hill , 814 F.2d at 1202 (asserting that the question under Rule 38 should never be whether an appellant's attorney has made "frivolous legal arguments willfully, or mali ciously, or with 'conscious indifference' to their validity, or otherwise in bad faith," since the standard for imposition of sanction under Rule 38 is an objective one that does not take into account factual issues such as the personal motives of the individual sanctioned); see also In re Perry, 918 F.2d 931, 934 (Fed. Cir. 1990 appeal, rather than the subjective bad faith of the appellant or the ap pellant's attorney.45
B. An Objective Approach to Defining Frivolity:
A "Reasonable Attorney " Test Because "[f]rivolity, like obscenity, is often difficult to define,"46 courts need a method for determining when an appeal is frivolous for purposes of the Rule 38 analysis. Using a "reasonable attorney" test, courts can exercise a level of obj ectivity that is consistent with that re quired by the plain language and legislative history of Rule 38. It is useful to compare the reasonable attorney test to the negligence stan dard in tort law. The concept of negligence incorporates the notion of the "reasonable person" into tort law.47 The reasonable person is an entirely objective, external standard defined by the community, rather than a subjective standard that focuses on the individual judgment or motivations of the particular actor.48 Similarly, pursuant to Rule 38, a court should hold appellants and their attorneys to a "reasonable at torney" standard -an objective, external standard defined by the le gal community which does not take into account the subjective intent of that attorney.49 At its core, Rule 38 analysis should "depend[] on 45. See, e.g., Nagle v. Alspach, 8 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 1993) ("(The Rule 38) inquiry is an objective one, focusing 'on the merits of the appeal regardless of good or bad faith.' " (ci tation omitted)); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 995 F.2d 1138, 1147 (2d Cir. 1993) (explaining that the standard for imposing a "frivolous appeal" penalty is whether "the appeal taken is found to be groundless, without foundation, and without merit"); In re Perry, 918 F.2d at 934 (holding that bad faith was not a requirement for imposing sanctions for a frivolous appeal, and that the standard is an objective one and has nothing to do with the mental state of the person sanctioned); Asbury v. Brougham, 866 F.2d 1276, 1283 (10th Cir. 1989) ("(S)ubjective bad faith is not a prerequisite to an award of damages and double costs; an appeal lacking foundation is sufficient."); Coghlan v. Starkey Upon that conclusion our inquiry ends and Rule 38 sanctions become appropriate. It would be fundamentally unfair to [appellee) if we permit [appellant] to compel [appellee] to court to defend an appeal that is wholly devoid of merit, without facing sanctions for doing so. It is a hollow victory indeed for an appellee who successfully defends a frivolous appeal, if it is then further penalized by fee payments to its own attorney. Accordingly, we will award at torney's fees in (the appeal], plus costs, as a sanction for pursuing a frivolous appeal.
Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 943 F.2d 346, 347 (3d Cir. 1991). the work product: neither the attorney's state of mind nor the prepara tion behind the appeal matter. "50 The only appropriate question for purposes of the Rule 38 analysis should be: "whether, following a thorough analysis of the record and careful research of the law, a rea sonable attorney would conclude that the appeal is frivolous."51 Where it "should have been obvious" to the reasonable attorney that the ap peal is frivolous, Rule 38 sanctions are appropriate.52
The determination of whether the appeal's frivolity should have been obvious to a reasonable attorney calls for the court to make an assessment of the quality of the arguments presented in the appeal. That a court can accomplish this objective, yet nuanced analysis in this context is clear from cases where courts declined to award Rule 38 sanctions because the arguments supporting an appeal, while obj ec tively meritless, did not rise to a degree of frivolity deserving of a Rule 38 sanction. In Mellon Bank Corp. v. First Union Real Estate Equity & Mortgage In vestments, the court did not impose Rule 38 sanctions be cause the appeal was not "wholly without merit."53 Similarly, in Meredith v. Na vistar International Transportation Corp. , the court re frained from imposing sanctions because, even though the appellant's presentation of the facts was a "pitch for a reversal" that was "way outside," it was "not so wild [a pitch] that sanctions for a frivolous ap peal are warranted."54 Also, in Matter of Sherk, the court held that the attorney's "bad habit" of "citing overruled cases" in the brief did not rise to the level of frivolity that, in its judgment, warranted a Rule 38 sanction.55 These cases demonstrate that a court can make this deci sion in an objective fashion that does not take into account the subjec tive intent of the offending attorney. Furthermore, these cases show that application of an obj ective reasonable attorney standard is not Cir. 1990 ).
overly harsh on attorneys because the bar for reasonableness is set quite low.
One significant danger of a purely obj ective Rule 38 analysis is that courts taking such an approach will chill novel or untested legal argu ments.56 It can be difficult in some cases for any judge to "draw the line 'between the tenuously arguable and the frivolous.' "57 Further more, from a more cynical point of view, any judge has the power to write an opinion making an appellant's argument seem frivolous, even if a dispassionate review of the law would suggest that the appeal has at least some merit.58 Thus, it is easy to see how an obj ective standard for Rule 38 could discourage an attorney from pursuing novel legal ar guments on behalf of his client. This result, of course, could interfere with a lawyer's ethical duty to "act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal and advocacy upon the client's behalf."59
To mitigate the chilling effect on novel meritorious arguments, courts should move with caution, classifying as frivolous only those appeals that lack "colorable" support or are wholly without merit.60 Colorable arguments are those that seem to be "true, valid, or right."61 To ensure that this standard is not hollow, a court should, in its expla nation of why an appeal is frivolous, point to specific indications of the 60. See, e.g., Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 943 F.2d 346, 347 n.1 (3d Cir. 1991) (refusing to impose Rule 38 sanctions in a related appeal wherein "[appellant] presented a marginal ar gument which, albeit poorly articulated, raised a "colorable argument"); Hilman, 899 F.2d at 253 ("This court has been reluctant to classify appeals as frivolous, so that novel theories will not be chilled and litigants advancing any claim or defense which has colorable support un der existing Jaw or reasonable extensions thereof will not be deterred."); see also, e.g., Nagle, 8 F.3d at 145 (quoting Finch, 926 F.2d at 1578); Zarowitz v. BankAmerica Corp., 866 F.2d 1164, 1166 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Too exuberant use of sanctions could chill some meritorious ap peals. We therefore hesitate to exercise our discretion by imposing a sanction in this case, even though the appeal borders on the frivolous."); Sauers v. Commissioner, 771 F.2d 64, 70 n.9 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1162 (1986) (denying the government's motion for sanctions because, even though most taxpayers' arguments on appeal are frivolous, appellant raised a genuine issue in this case).
61. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 259 (7th ed. 1999); see also WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 449 (1993) (defining "colorable" as "seemingly valid and genuine: having an appearance of truth ... : Plausible").
appeal's meritlessness.62 For example, courts have made clear that an appeal has absolutely no chance of success if the appellant's brief makes only conclusory allegations with no factual underpinnings,63 if the brief on its face has no intelligible, ascertainable claims,64 or if the appellant filed the appeal in the face of long-established precedent, but gave no explanation for why this precedent must be pushed aside.65 Courts have also made clear that an appeal is not frivolous simply because it fails to cite obscure or ancient precedent.66 Thus, by applying a reasonable attorney test, and by classifying an appeal as frivolous only when an appeal lacks colorable support, courts not only can define frivolity in a manner that is consistent with the obj ectivity required by the ordinary language of Rule 38, but also can mitigate the chilling effect a purely obj ective approach could have on arguments that are novel, but meritorious.
C. Only One Step of Objective Analysis Is Necessary
The objective assessment of the merits of an appeal, described in Section I.B, is all that is necessary to determine whether an appeal is frivolous for purposes of the Rule 38 sanction.67 Some courts, however, implement a subjective second step to the Rule 38 analysis.68 Such courts analyze the surrounding circumstances to determine whether the appellant or the appellant's attorney pursued the appeal in bad 62. See Martineau, Frivolous Appeals, supra note 21, at 850 ("When a court finds an ap peal to be frivolous, it usually labels the appeal as 'utterly without merit' or 'no chance of success.' In attaching one of these labels to the appeal, the courts point to various indicia of hopelessness.").
63. See faith.69 Courts taking this two-step approach, therefore, do not com pletely ignore the obj ective nature of Rule 38; rather, they take the position that an additional, subjective inquiry is permissible because it comes after the obj ective inquiry. If a court determines in its second step of analysis that there is no evidence of bad faith, it may decide not to impose a Rule 38 sanction, even though it determined in its first step of analysis that the appeal is objectively frivolous.70
Some courts mistakenly apply a two-step analysis because of their confusion over the procedures for assessing sanctions, as well as the source of their authority for doing so. After all, there are no standard procedures for courts to follow in their deliberations over whether to assess sanctions.71 Furthermore, the precedent concerning a court's authority for imposing sanctions pursuant to Rule 38 can also seem cloudy; many courts who have assessed sanctions previously neglected to indicate whether they were relying on Rule 38, the court's inherent authority, or section 1927 of the U.S. Code to impose sanctions for the filing of a frivolous appeal.72 Rule 38 alone provides authority for im posing sanctions, and the reasonable attorney test provides a method for courts to follow.
Other courts mistakenly use a two-step approach because they rea son that an inquiry into the subjective intent of the appellant or the appellant's attorney is necessary to make a fair judgment about who is actually responsible for the frivolous nature of the appeal,73 even when it is already determined that the legal arguments presented in support of the appeal are objectively meritless.74 These courts typically con sider whether the appellant, or the appellant's attorney, has a good faith defense which might absolve him from responsibility.75 For ex-69. See Ross, 5 F.3d at 1090 (requiring, in addition to objective meritlessness, "some evidence of bad faith").
70. See Martineau, Ways of the Circuits, supra note 18, at 661. After reviewing many de cisions of the different United States courts of appeals, Martineau concluded that reluctant circuits require "evidence of purposeful, intentional harassment or delay creat[ing] a stan dard of frivolousness so high that only the most excessive conduct invokes the authority to impose sanctions." Id. 71. See Martineau, Frivolous Appeals, supra note 21, at 872. 72. Id. (explaining that this problem is "particularly acute" when the court is acting sua sponte, rather than in response to a motion filed by an appellee, because a motion or sup porting memorandum will likely cite a statute or rule as the basis for the motion).
73. See, e.g., Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, 1514 (10th Cir. 1987) ("But the deter mination to impose sanctions on an attorney for bringing a frivolous appeal involves [a sec ond] step -placing the blame. And there remains for consideration the defenses which might absolve the lawyer of the responsibility for taking the frivolous appeal.").
74. See, e.g., id.; Herzfeld & Stern v. Blair, 769 F.2d 645, 647 (10th Cir. 1985) (noting that Counsel's "lack of good faith is manifest" in using baseless appeal to delay the payment of judgment and also by his "cavalier" or reckless mis-citation to the record, which "added grievously to the frivolous nature of his appeal").
75. See Braley, 832 F.2d 1504; Herzfeld, 769 F.2d 645.
ample, in Gilles v. Burton Construction Co. ,76 even though the court found that the appeal was objectively frivolous for purposes of Rule 38, the Seventh Circuit decided that it was not appropriate to impose sanctions because the appellants were not "solely responsible" for the confusion surrounding the appeal of a nonappealable order.77
A single-step reasonable attorney test, though, properly focuses on the conduct of the person who is typically responsible for the merits of an appeal -the appellant's attorney.78 Professional ethics bind an at torney, rather than his client, to do the necessary research to assess a claim's merits;79 failure to do so is a per se violation of that attorney's ethical duty to his clients, as well as to the court system.80 An attorney who files a frivolous appeal breaches his affirmative ethical duty to make meritorious legal arguments on the client's behalf. 81 Unlike a party, an attorney should be able to do the necessary research to evaluate properly the merits of a claim. Furthermore, it would seem that the personal animosity often existing between the actual litigants would be less likely to exist on the part of the attorney, toward either opposing counsel or his or her client. ... Before filing suit, it would seem to be a rea sonable expectation that the attorney do some basic research on the applicable law.
Id. In Hilmon Co. v. Hyatt Int'/, the Third Circuit explained:
[The test is whether, following a thorough analysis of the record and careful research of the law, a reasonable attorney would conclude that the appeal is frivolous.] Here, the blamewor thy acts consist of either ignoring or purposely disregarding the law and procedure. These are areas of expertise customarily committed to counsel and not the party. We see no reason whatsoever why the burden of attorney error or ignorance should fall full upon [appellant], who had a right to rely upon its attorney ... who is responsible for pursuing the frivolous appeal. 899 F.2d 250, 254 (3d Cir. 1990 ); see also Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 943 F.2d 346 (3dCir. 1991).
81. See Hi/mon, 899 F.2d at 254:
[A ]ttorneys have an affirmative obligation to research the law and to determine if a claim on appeal is utterly without merit and may be deemed frivolous. We conclude that if counsel ig nore or fail in this obligation to their client, they do so at their peril and may become per sonally liable to satisfy a Rule 38 award.
has no ethical obligation to abandon his professional discretion just to try to gain an advantage for a client.82 As one court reasoned, "Telling would-be litigants that the law is against them is an essential part of a lawyer's job."83 Thus, an attorney should refrain from advancing meritless arguments simply to see if any will "stick," even if this dan gerous appellate strategy is consistent with the client's wishes.84 Fur thermore, in order to protect a court's ability to hear meritorious ap peals, an attorney has a duty to refrain from appealing as a "conditioned reflex."85 An attorney who files an appeal asks for the court's attention, and therefore, has an affirmative responsibility to the court to make reasonably well-developed arguments.86 A single step reasonable attorney test for Rule 38 makes sense because it pro vides a fair way of judging whether the attorney has lived up to the ethical duties he owes both to his client and to the court.
Courts should also use the objective single-step test to determine the level of sanctions to impose under Rule 38. One commentator proposed that, after the first step of objective analysis, an inquiry into the subjective bad faith of an attorney should be relevant to the meas ure of the Rule 38 sanction.87 Given the objective nature of Rule 38,88 however, this approach would be textually defensible only if the actual words of the current Rule were changed accordingly.89 Under the ex-
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. [1] (1998) ("[A]
lawyer is not bound to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client. A lawyer has profes sional discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be pursued."). 89. See Martineau, Frivolous Appeals, supra note 21, at 881. Martineau proposes that isting Rule 38, a court's judgment of the objective merits of the appeal is all that is relevant.w Thus, a second step of inquiry into subjective bad faith of the appellant, or of the appellant's attorney, should not be relevant to any stage of the Rule 38 analysis.
Using an appellee's actual costs and attorney fees as its measure, a court can determine "just damages" in one objective step of analysis.91 The plain language of the Rule does not indicate that a remand is nec essary for the determination of the appropriate level of fees,92 a_nd an inquiry into the reasonableness of the fees and costs need not take place, except in extraordinary circumstances.93 If, however, a court finds it too difficult to determine the actual fees and costs, that court can remand the issue to the district court.94
This is not to say that courts have no discretion at all as to the ap propriate level of just damages and costs. The Rule expressly provides for judicial discretion: courts "may" choose to award either "single or double costs."95 Because the Rule has no scienter requirement,96 though, a court should in an obj ective fashion make its decision about whether an appeal warrants a sanction of single costs or double costs on the basis of how meritless the brief is.
the first section of Rule 38 should be amended to read:
A court of appeals shall impose a sanction upon a party or attorney or both for taking or continuing an appeal or initiating a proceeding in the court that the court finds to be frivo lous. For purposes of this rule, a frivolous appeal is one that has no reasonable legal or fac tual basis. The discretion Rule 38 gives courts to choose between single and double costs, however, may seem to undermine the objective approach to the Rule advocated by this Note. In Coghlan v. Starkey,97 for exam ple, the Fifth Circuit makes its decision to impose single costs -as opposed to double costs -in a manner that suggests that courts inevi tably must consider the subjective state of mind of the appellant or the appellant's attorney to make such a decision. Having concluded that a "patently meritless" appeal warranted Rule 38 sanctions,98 the Coghlan court sought to distinguish it from the more "egregious" ap peals that justify an award of double costs.99 Rather than distinguishing the appeal in a purely objective manner, however, the court seems to suggest that what makes the appeal in question less egregious is the "good faith impression" of the appellant's attorney that the lower court's decision was erroneous.100 The court's consideration of the at torney's subjective state of mind, however, was an unnecessary stepcourts have demonstrated an ability to make such decisions objec tively.101 The Coghlan court, therefore, should have decided that the only factor relevant to its decision concerning the appropriate level of costs was the lack of rational argument presented in the appeal.102 As this Part has shown, neither the plain language nor the legislative his tory of Rule 38 indicates that scienter is relevant to the analysis, and courts should apply a one-step reasonable attorney test focused on the objective merits of the appeal.
852 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1988).
98. Id. at 813 ("Rule 38 concerns are amply raised in this case by conclusory assertions of an alleged right in an appellate brief that cites only two cases, and fails to explain even those two."). Id. 99. Id. [T]he circumstances of this case are not egregious enough to justify compensation of the prevailing party beyond its actual out-of-pocket outlays on appeal. Hence, we will not im pose both attorneys' fees and double costs here. Nonetheless, the actions of plaintiffs coun sel are sufficient to suggest the propriety of an award of attorneys' fees in addition to the single costs normally assessed as of right against the losing party. 100. Id. 1985) (deciding to assess double costs pursuant to Rule 38 because the appellant not only contradicted precedent, but also failed to challenge the district court's finding).
102. The court identified that the appeal demonstrated a "total inability to distinguish dispositive authority or make rational argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of precedent." Coghlan, 852 F.2d at 813.
II. S ANCTIONING THE A PPELLANT ' S A TTORNEY
This Part argues that a court can and should impose the entire burden of Rule 38 sanctions on the appellant's attorney. Section II.A asserts that, although this approach does not find explicit approval in Rule 38's text, it is defensible for two reasons. First, the attorney is typically the individual who is responsible for the merits of the argu ments presented in a frivolous appeal. Second, Rule 46(c) of the Fed eral Rules of Civil Procedure provides authority for this approach. Section II.B proposes an "institutional appellant" exception to this approach. In cases where the attorney represents a sophisticated insti tutional party, a court should impose Rule 38 sanctions jointly be tween the client and attorney.
A . Those Responsible Must Bear the Burden
Even though Rule 38's plain language makes no mention of whom a court should sanction,103 it is appropriate for a court applying the reasonable attorney standard to impose the full burden of Rule 38 sanctions on the appellant's attorney. If courts are to apply a reason able attorney standard, it follows that sanctions for an appeal which does not meet this standard should be brought against an attorney, rather than a client. Furthermore, it is the attorney -rather than the client -who is typically responsible for the obj ectively meritless ar guments presented in a frivolous appeal.104 In Hill v. Norfolk, for ex ample, where the appellant was a railroad brakeman with no practical legal experience, Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit ex plained: "[W]e also do not suppose, however, that a railroad brake man is responsible for frivolous legal arguments, so we are minded to order [the appellant's] counsel to bear personally the expense incurred by the railroad in briefing the issues that we have found were frivo lously raised by [the appellant's] opening brief."105 Similarly, in Acevedo v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,106 the court decided that assessing Rule 38 sanctions against the appellant's attorney, rather than the appellant himself, was appropriate because the appel lant had only a modest education; it therefore was unlikely that the appellant was responsible in any truly meaningful way for the and some courts look to Rule 11 for guidance in interpreting Rule 38 in spite of the fact that Rule 11 does not apply to appellate practice.112
The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 11 explains that monetary sanctions for frivolous contentions of law are "more properly placed solely on the party's attorneys."113 An appellate court should therefore take the view that, when an appeal is objectively frivolous, the attor ney should naturally be the one to bear the burden of the monetary sanction, regardless of that attorney's subjective good faith.114 118. This argument may seem to contradict the argument advanced by this Note that a state of mind requirement cannot be read into Rule 38 because the Rule is silent and be cause there is no language corresponding to "vexatious," as there is in 28 U.S.C. § 1927. See supra Section I.A. However, Rule 38's ordinary language does not indicate who should be sanctioned, so a court must decide this issue for itself. It is, therefore, not inconsistent with the ordinary language of Rule 38 for a court to assess sanctions directly upon an attorney as an imposition of a Rule 46(c) disciplinary sanction. This approach should be distinguished from one which voluntarily reads a state of mind requirement into Rule 38 and thereby ig nores the plain meaning of the text. 121. See In re Perry, 918 F.2d 931, 936 (Fed. Cir. 1990 ) ("This court has speci f ically held that rule 46(c) has no applicability to the imposition of damages and costs under Rule 38." (citing To epfer, 792 F.2d 1102 )).
The obstacle created by the hearing requirement, though, is over come by the fact that, typically, the arguments that are frivolous as filed in the appellate brief embody the sanctionable conduct. Because a procedural hearing on sanctions is mandatory only if there is a con tested factual issue, there can be no factual issue that creates a right to a hearing when the appeal is frivolous as filed, regardless of whether the right is expressly provided in a rule, as it is in 46(c).122 Thus, the ab sence of a hearing requirement in Rule 38 does not fatally undermine the arguments in support of justifying the assessment of Rule 38 sanc tions directly against attorneys as a Rule 46( c) sanction. This is not to say that an appellate court does not have a duty to provide the attorney with notice and an opportunity to respond before it imposes Rule 38 sanctions.123 Even though the unambiguous lan guage of the Rule itself should provide attorneys with general notice that they can be sanctioned for filing a frivolous appeal, actual notice is required.124 This was not the case until the 1994 Amendment to Rule 38, which added the notice requirement.125 Yet, as discussed above, no oral hearing is required because there are no factual issues -such as the attorney's subjective intent -at stake. The text of Rule 38, and our previous decisions applying it, provide all the notice that an at torney could reasonably demand that sanctions may be imposed on counsel directly for the making of frivolous legal arguments in this court -and imposed without a hearing, if there are no fa ctual questions.
Id.; see also In re Perry, 918 F.2d at 935: Practitioners in this court are expected to know and follow the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and the precedents in the court's published jurisprudence. Rule 38 provides for sanctioning frivolous appeals. From an early date, this court has indicated that it will not hesitate to apply sanctions against parties and their counsel in appropriate cases ... [a]ll members of the bar of this court, including Perry, have thus long been on notice that they may be personally liable for sanctions if they prosecute a frivolous appeal. (citations omit ted).
Id. But see Hill, 814 F.2d at 1207-08 (Parsons, J., dissenting):
There is to be drawn a distinction between the general notice about sanctions and notice that sanctions are being considered. Traditional procedural steps should always be taken before assessment of a penalty is made .... The need to deter frivolous litigation should never be considered demanding enough to cause us judges to weaken those structures of fundamental fairness upon which our judicial system rests.
125. See is not entitled to an opportunity for written or oral explanation -we need afford no oppor tunity to explain misstatements and distortions in the briefs when their inaccuracy is appar ent and no possible explanation could justify their inclusion."). court can safely follow Judge Posner's approach in Hill: after the court determined that the appeal was obj ectively frivolous, the court im posed sanctions on the appellant's attorney and gave appellee fifteen days to submit proper documentation of costs to the clerk of the court, after which appellant was given an opportunity to respond.127 B. The "Institutional Appellant" Exception One danger of imposing the full burden of Rule 38 sanctions on at torneys is that sophisticated institutional appellants will escape blame in cases where they deserve it. In cases where the appellant must rely completely on the advice of the attorney, the argument that the attor ney should bear the full burden of sanctions is particularly strong.128 Yet, where the party is a large, sophisticated institution, a court should bring sanctions jointly against the attorney and the client, since the two are in the best position to determine who (between the two of them) caused the appeal to be filed.129 An analogy to the arguments in the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 11 supports this view. The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 11 suggests the appropriateness of an "additional inquiry" into the propriety of assessing sanctions against the party itself (along with the attorney) when that party is a governmental agency or institutional party, since those bodies typi cally put significant restrictions on their attorneys' discretionP0 In the Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, 1515 (10th Cir. 1987) (arguing that an adversarial, evi dentiary hearing is not required); Hill, 814 F.2d at 1201: (W)e believe absolutely that an attorney ordered to pay money as a sanction for the filing of a frivolous suit or appeal is entitled to due process of law, and that this entitlement includes an opportunity for a hearing if a factual question concerning the propriety of sanctions is raised .... But obviously the right to a hearing ... is limited to cases where a hearing would assist the court in its decision. Where, as in this and most Rule 38 cases, the conduct that is sought to be sanctioned consists of making objectively groundless legal arguments in briefs filed in this court, there are no issues that a hearing could illuminate.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Martineau, Frivolous Appeals, supra note 21, at 876:
The courts have provided no uniform definition of a hearing, and have emphasized that the type of hearing required will vary from case to case. Courts seldom discuss whether an oral hearing is necessary when a motion is made in the appellate court. The oral argument on the merits is the only oral portion of the appellate process, and in many cases even the merits are decided on the basis of briefs with no oral argument. Various motions are uniformly made and acted upon without an oral hearing. Appellate Rule 27, which governs motions in the courts of appeals, does not require an oral hearing on any type of motion, substantive or procedural. Co nsequently, there does not appear to be any more reason to require an oral hearing on a motion for a frivolous appeal sanction than on any other type of motion. When appropriate, the court can make an additional inquiry in order to determine whether Rule 38 context, courts have demonstrated an ability to make this ad ditional inquiry into the "sophistication" of the client, as well.131 This is only a narrow exception that is consistent with the obj ectivity required by Rule 38 (i.e., it does not inquire into the "bad faith" intent of an at torney or the appellant). Furthermore, it is consistent with Rule 38's deterrence goal, discussed below, because it seeks to place the blame on the individuals who are truly responsible for the frivolous argu ments presented to the court.
Ill. THE DETERRENCE GOAL ... AND ITS LIMIT Section III.A argues that an objective, single-step reasonable at torney test is best for achieving the policy goal of deterring frivolous appeals. Section 111.B argues that courts should make an exception to the objective reasonable attorney test when an appellant proceeds pro se. In such cases, an inquiry into the pro se appellant's practical legal experience is appropriate to determine whether to impose sanctions.
A. Deterring Frivolous Appeals Is the Name of the Game
At its core, Rule 38 is an instrument for discouraging attorneys from filing frivolous appeals.132 To this end, an objective, single-step reasonable attorney test is preferable to a test that requires an inquiry into an attorney's subjective state of mind. This is true for two reasons. First, because an attorney's subjective intent is often difficult to prove, the threat of sanctions authorized by Rule 38 -or any other rule -is considerably less ominous if courts require evidence of an attorney's bad faith.133 Second, courts applying standards that take into account Id. the sanction should be imposed on such persons, firms, or parties ... in addition to ... the person actually making the presentation to the court. For example, such an inquiry may be appropriate in cases involving government agencies or other institutional parties that fre quently impose substantial restrictions on the discretion of individual attorneys employed by it. an attorney's subjective state of mind are often unwilling to punish ac tions undertaken by an attorney in his representative capacity.134 This unwillingness is particularly conspicuous when courts must apply a "malice" standard, as they must when they entertain a section 1927 or malicious prosecution action.135 For example, in deciding whether to impose section 1927 sanctions, one court excused from liability an at torney who knowingly, but reluctantly, brought a meritless suit at his client's behest.136 Thus, a standard requiring evidence of an attorney's bad faith narrows the range of circumstances under which courts are willing to find and punish attorney misconduct137 and thereby enables an attorney acting in his representative capacity to file an appeal con taining groundless arguments without fear of sanction -even if he knows the arguments presented in the appeal are obj ectively frivo lous.138
The rationale for imposing Rule 11 sanctions against attorneys, also useful to an understanding of Rule 38,139 supports the argument that a reasonable attorney test is best for deterring frivolous appeals.
For example, in Berwick Grain Co. v. Illinois Department of Agriculture, an attorney appealing the Rule 11 sanctions imposed upon him by the district court offered as his excuse that, even though he looked for legal support before he filed his motion, he found none.140 The appellate court rejected his excuse and found that he should not have filed the lawsuit in the first place.141 As that court ar gued, the very point of Rule 11 sanctions is to lend incentive for attor neys to "stop, think, and investigate more carefully before serving and filing papers."142 Similarly, one of the primary purposes of Rule 38 sanctions is "to encourage attorneys to be reflective about the issues they present for review,"143 since an appeal should not be a "knee jerk reaction" to an unfavorable ruling.144 Thus, it follows that it is best for deterrence purposes that the attorneys themselves bear the burden of Rule 38 sanctions as well since "penalizing the [appellant] 'will not guarantee that his attorney will be directly affected or that he will be deterred from filing similar frivolous appeals in the future. ' Where an appellant proceeds pro se and has no practical experi ence in the law, courts should contain their efforts to deter frivolous appeals by refraining from imposing Rule 38 sanctions.156 It is contrary to Rule 38's deterrence goal for courts to impose sanctions against pro se appellants who, because they are not attorneys themselves, often do not fully understand why the legal arguments they present to the court have no merit. As one court explained, Rule 38 seeks to discourage only the "blameworthy acts" of "ignoring or purposefully disregarding the law and procedure."157 These are "areas of the expertise customar ily committed to counsel" who can provide "sound advice on both the law and procedure."158
It is, however, consistent with the purpose of Rule 38 for a court to assess sanctions against a pro se appellant who has had some practical legal experience or training. A court's inquiry into an appellant's prac tical legal experience would, of course, be a second step following the court's initial obj ective assessment of the merits of the appeal. Courts have demonstrated an ability to make such an inquiry to determine whether or not to impose Rule 38 sanctions.159 For example, one court assessed Rule 38 sanctions against a corporation president, even though the president was proceeding pro se, because he had practical experience dealing with attorneys; sanctions were appropriate because the president should have understood that the reason many attorneys refused to represent him in the matter was that his position was objec tively frivolous.160 While this approach is not entirely consistent with 155. See supra Section I.A.
156. See, e.g., Lonsdale v. Comm'r, 661 F.2d 71, 72 (5th Cir. 1981) (refraining from in voking Rule 38 sanctions against pro se appellant in a tax dispute, even though the appel lant's arguments were stale and had longstanding precedent aligned against them).
157. Hilmon Co. v. Hyatt Int'I, 899 F.2d 250, 254 (3d Cir. 1990 ).
158. Id. 159. See Hilman, 899 F.2d at 254. (assessing damages against pro se appellant because of the appellant's "practical experience with the law"); see also 
CONCLUSION
This Note argued that the language and legislative history of Rule 38 indicate that an objective, single-step reasonable attorney test is the most appropriate test under Rule 38. It also argued that courts should ordinarily assess the full burden of the sanction -the obj ective meas ure of the attorney fe es and costs -against the appellant's attorney.
Not only does this approach conform to the plain meaning of the stat ute, it is also best from a policy perspective because it seeks to deter those who are typically responsible for filing objectively frivolous legal arguments -the attorneys. Several qualifications to the reasonable attorney test, discussed above, balance the Rule 38 policy of deterring frivolous claims against competing policy concerns -such as the con cerns that novel appeals will be "chilled," that blame will be unfairly assigned to pro se appellants, or that the entire burden of sanctions will be unfairly placed on attorneys who work for sophisticated institu tional parties who give little decision-making authority to their attor neys. In sum, a one-step reasonable attorney test for Rule 38, coupled with the imposition of Rule 38 sanctions against the attorneys who are responsible for presenting frivolous arguments to the courts, promises not only to help appellate courts stay afloat, but also to ensure that courts imposing such sanctions do so only in appropriate circum stances.
